McEliece PKC (Public-Key Cryptosystem), whose security is based on the decoding problem, is one of a few alternatives for the current PKCs that are mostly based on either IFP (Integer Factoring Problem) or DLP (Discrete Logarithm Problem), which would be solved in polynomial-time after the emergence of quantum computers. It is known that the McEliece PKC with an appropriate conversion satisfies (in the random oracle model) the strongest security notion IND-CCA2 (INDistinguishability of encryption against adaptively Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) under the assumption that breaking OW-CPA (One-Wayness against Chosen-Plaintext Attacks) of the underlying McEliece PKC, i.e. the McEliece PKC with no conversion, is infeasible. Breaking OW-CPA of it is still infeasible if an appropriate parameter, n ≥ 2048 with optimum t and k, is chosen since the binary work factor to break it with the best CPA is around 2 106 for (n, k, t) = (2048, 1278, 70). The aim of the modification at Asiacrypt 2000 is to improve it of the next smaller parameter n = 1024 to a safe level 2 88 from an almost dangerous level 2 62 . If his idea works correctly, we can use the more compact system safely. In this paper, we carefully review the modification at Asiacrypt 2000, and then show that the one-wayness of it is vulnerable against our new CPAs.
Introduction
Since the concept of public-key cryptosystem (PKC) was introduced by Diffie and Hellman [5] , many researchers have proposed numerous PKCs based on various problems, such as integer factoring, discrete logarithm, decoding a large linear code, knapsack, inverting polynomial equations, lattice and so on. While some of them are still alive, most of them were broken by cryptographers due to their intensive cryptanalysis. As a result, almost all of the current secure systems on the market employ only a small class of PKCs, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptosystems, which are all based on either integer factoring problem (IFP) or discrete logarithm problem (DLP). This situation would cause a serious problem after someone discovers one practical algorithm which breaks both IFP and DLP in polynomial-time. Who can prove that such an algorithm will never be found? Actually, Shor has already found a (probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithm in [17] , even though it requires a quantum computer that is impractical so far. In order to prepare for such unfortunate situations, we need to find another secure scheme relying on neither IFP nor DLP.
The McEliece PKC, proposed by R.J. McEliece in [15] , is one of a few alternatives for the PKCs based on IFP or DLP. It is based on the decoding problem of a large linear code with no visible structure which is conjectured to be an NPcomplete problem.
1 While several attacks [1, 3, 4, 7, 11, 14, 19] are known on the McEliece PKC, all of them can be prevented by either enlarging the parameter size or applying an appropriate conversion to it [10] .
The McEliece PKC with an appropriate conversion in [10] satisfies (in the random oracle model [2] ) the strongest security notion IND-CCA2 (INDistinguishability of encryption [6] against adaptively Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks) under the assumption that it is infeasible to break OW-CPA (One-Wayness against Chosen-Plaintext Attacks) of the underlying McEliece PKC. OW-CPA is said to be broken if one can recover the whole plaintext of an arbitrarily given ciphertext using neither partial knowledge on the plaintext nor decryption oracles. It is still infeasible to break OW-CPA of the McEliece PKC if an appropriate parameter, n ≥ 2048 with optimum t and k, is chosen since the binary work factor to break it with the best CPA [4] is around 2 106 for (n, k, t) = (2048, 1278, 70). At Asiacrypt 2000, a modification of the McEliece PKC was proposed by P. Loidreau. While his modification does not improve the immunity against attacks using decryption oracles, such as the malleability attack [8, 19] and the reaction attack [7] , or attacks using partial knowledge on the target plaintext, such as the related-message attack [3] , the message-resend attack [3] and the known-partialplaintext attack [9] , it does not matter since all of them can be prevented with a conversion. The aim of his modification is to improve the binary work factor for breaking OW-CPA of the next smaller parameter n = 1024 to a safe level 2 88 from an almost dangerous level 2 62 . If his idea works correctly, we can use the more compact system safely.
In this paper, we carefully review the modification at Asiacrypt 2000 to see whether it truely improves OW-CPA or not. Then we show that it is vulnerable against our "new" CPAs on OW (even though the modification certainly enhances OW against "ever known" CPAs). Our attacks exploit only the modified structure of it and thus cannot be applied to the original (unmodified) McEliece. This means the OW-CPA of the the original (unmodified) McEliece PKC is still infeasible as long as an secure parameter is chosen. This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 and 3, we describe both the McEliece PKC and the ever known CPAs on OW of it, respectively. Then, in Section 4, we review the modified cryptosystem proposed by Loidreau [13] .
Finally, in Section 5, we show our new CPAs which weaken the one-wayness of the modified cryptosystem.
McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem

Cryptosystems
The McEliece PKC consists of the following key generation, encryption and decryption systems:
Key generation: One generates the following three matrices G,S,P :
G: k × n generator matrix of a binary Goppa code that can correct up to t errors, and for which an efficient decoding algorithm Ψ () is known. The parameter t is given by
where d min denotes the minimum Hamming distance of the code. S: k × k random binary non-singular matrix P : n × n random permutation matrix. Then, computes the k × n matrix G = SGP . Secret key: (S, P ) and Ψ () Public key: (G , t) Encryption: The ciphertext c of a given message msg is calculated as follows:
where msg a binary vector of length k, and z denotes a random binary error vector of length n having t 1's. Decryption: First, one calculates cP −1 where
and P −1 denotes the inverse of P . Second, applies the decoding algorithm Ψ () to cP −1 . Since the Hamming weight of z · P −1 is t, Ψ () can correct it:
Now, the plaintext msg of c can be obtained by
Underlying Codes
As the underlying codes of the McEliece PKC, we recommend to employ Goppa codes but other codes, such as Reed-Solomon codes, BCH codes and so on. The difference between them is whether the weight distribution is determined by the public parameters n and k. While the Goppa codes have a variety of the weight distributions according to the underlying Goppa polynomials even if both n and k are fixed, both the Reed-Solomon codes and BCH codes have only the fixed weight distribution depending on both n and k. In other words, when both n and k are given from a public matrix G , one can know the underlying code G if codes like Reed-Solomon or BCH are used. Then once G is found, an adversary can reveal the permutation P between G and G using the SSA(Support Splitting Algorithm) [16] that can reveal the permutation P between the codes having the same weight distribution. The other secret matrix S can be revealed using G and G P −1 with a simple linear algebra. The next case we have to avoid is that the candidates for G is small enough to enumerate. In this case, the following attack is possible [14] . An adversary picks up a candidate for G and then sees whether it has the same weight distribution as G . If it has, it is the correct G. The following processes to obtain both P and S are the same as the previous attack.
The former attack can be avoided using a Goppa code, and then the latter attack can be avoided using a Goppa code where the cardinality of the Goppa polynomials is too large to enumerate.
Known Chosen Plaintext Attacks on One-Wayness of McEliece PKC
Since the aim of the modification at Asiacrypt 2000 is to enhance the immunity against CPAs on OW, we focus on them. Note that the attack on the public key [14] can be avoided if one choose the underlying Goppa polynomial out of a large set enough to avoid the exhaustive search, and also the other attacks either abusing decryption oracles, such as the malleability attack [8, 19] and the reaction attack [7] , or abusing partial knowledge on the target plaintext, such as the related-message attack [3] , the message-resend attack [3] and the knownpartial-plaintext attack [9] , can be avoided by applying an appropriate conversion in [10] . Only the following two attacks are known as the CPAs on OW of the McEliece PKC. They can be summarized as follows.
Generalized Information-Set-Decoding Attack
Let G k denote k independent columns picked out of G , and then let c k and z k denote the corresponding k coordinates of c and z, respectively. They have the following relationship
If z k = 0 and G k is non-singular, msg can be recovered [1] by
Even if z k = 0, msg can be obtained by guessing z k among small Hamming weights [11] , i.e. Hw(z k ) ≤ j for small j. The correctness of the recovered plaintext msg is verifiable by checking whether the Hamming weight of
is t or not.
The corresponding algorithm is summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1 (GISD)
Input: a ciphertext c, a public key (G , t) and an attack parameter j ∈ Z. Output: a plaintext msg.
1. Choose k independent columns out of G , and then calculateĜ k := G −1 k G . Let I denote the set of the indexes of the k chosen columns, and then J denote the set of the remaining columns. 2. Do the following until msg is found:
Replace one coordinate in I with a coordinate in J, and then renew thê
We estimate the binary work factor of the above GISD attack as follows. In
k G is the k ×n matrix where the chosen k columns make the identity matrix. It can be obtained by the Gaussian elimination with the work factor of
bit operations. When one checks the Hamming weight in Step 2.1 and Step B, he/she does not need to calculate the whole n coordinates of c ⊕ c kĜ k in Step 2.1 andẑ ⊕ z kĜ k in Step B, respectively, since he/she can know whether their weight exceeds t or not with around 2t coordinates in J provided that wrong cases have the average weight of n/2. Thus the binary work factor for calculating the 2t coordinates of c ⊕ c kĜ k in Step 2.1 is t · k/2, and that ofẑ ⊕ z kĜ k in
Step B is t · i 1 . Accordingly, the work factor for Step 2.2 is
In Step 2.3, one needs to updateĜ k = G −1 k G whose binary work factor is
Since
Step 2 is repeated around T j times where:
the total work factor is given by
When n is given, designers of the cryptosystem can optimize both k and t to make (12) higher, and then attackers can optimize the attack parameter j to make it lower. For n = 2 10 , min j (max k,t (W j )) ≈ 2 67 , which can be achieved when j = 1, t = 38 to 40 and k = n − m · t = 644 to 624, respectively. For n = 2 11 , min j (max k,t (W j )) ≈ 2 113 , which can be achieved when j = 1, t = 63 to 78 and k = n − m · t = 1355 to 1190, respectively.
Finding-Low-Weight-Codeword Attack
This attack uses an algorithm which accepts both an arbitrary generator matrix and a positive integer w, and then finds out a codeword of weight w [18, 4] . Since the codeword of weight t of the following (k + 1) × n generator matrix
is the error vector z where c = msg · G ⊕ z, this algorithm can be used to recover msg from given c and G . This algorithm is summarized as follows:
Algorithm 2 (FLWC)
Input: a ciphertext c, a public key (G , t) and attack parameters (p, ρ) ∈ Z × Z. Output: a plaintext msg. 1. Choose k + 1 independent columns from (13) and then apply Gaussian elimination to obtain a (k + 1) × n matrix where chosen k + 1 columns make the identity matrix. Let I denote a set of the indexes of the k + 1 chosen coordinates, and J denote those of the remaining coordinates. 2. Do the following until a code word z of weight t is found:
2.1 Split I in two subsets I 1 and I 2 at random where Replace one coordinate in I with a coordinate in J, and then make the chosen k + 1 columns be the identity matrix using Gaussian elimination. 3. Apply the information-set decoding to c ⊕ z, and then recover the corresponding message msg.
Under the assumption that each iteration is independent, one needs to repeat Step 2 around T p,ρ times where
In Step 2.1 to 2.4, one needs to compute both Λ 1,i|Jρ and Λ 2,j|Jρ for about
combinations, respectively, whose binary work factor is around
In Step 2.5, around (k+1)/2 p 2 /2 ρ pairs of (P 1,i , P 2,j ) satisfies Λ 1,i|Jρ ⊕Λ 2,j|Jρ = 0, and for each pair one needs to check the weight of Λ 1,i|J ⊕Λ 2,j|J . In the same way as Algorithm 1, one can know that Hw(Λ 1,i|J ⊕ Λ 2,j|J ) = t − 2p by calculating the weight of around 2(t − 2p) coordinates in J. Thus the binary work factor for Step 2.5 is around
The binary work factor for updating the generator matrix in Step 2.6 is
Thus the total binary work factor is given by
For n = 2 10 , min p,ρ (max k,t (W p,ρ )) ≈ 2 62 , which can be achieved when (p, ρ) = (2, 19), t = 36 to 43 and k = n − m · t = 664 to 594, respectively. For n = 2 11 , min p,ρ (max k,t (W p,ρ )) ≈ 2 106 , which can be achieved when (p, ρ) = (2, 22), t = 63 to 79 and k = n − m · t = 1355 to 1179, respectively.
Loidreau's Modification at Asiacrypt 2000
The aim of the modification at Asiacrypt 2000 [13] is to improve the difficulty of breaking OW-CPA without increasing n. It uses some linear transformation f () such that f (C) = C (C being the Goppa code of the PKC). Instead of choosing an error vector of small weight, it uses an error vector z such that f (z ) has small weight. This way, the error vector itself can have higher Hamming weight, and it is harder to find it via the usual search methods.
In this section, we review the underlying principles and the modified cryptosystem more precisely.
Frobenius Automorphism Group of Goppa Codes
Let us consider the Goppa code
If all the coefficients of the Goppa polynomial g is in a subfield 
where
Orbits Generated by Frobenius Automorphism
The action of the Frobenius automorphism makes some orbits in the field. For simplicity, we consider the field extension F 2 5s of F 2 s , and the corresponding Frobenius automorphism σ : x → x 2 s . The action of the Frobenius automorphism to F 2 5s makes N 5 = (2 5s − 2 s )/5 orbits of size 5 and 2 s orbits of size 1. In other words, a word {z α1 , z α2 , · · · , z αn } can be rewritten in the following form after reordering its labeling L:
where For the reordered coordinate, the action of the Frobenius automorphism σ on a word z is given as follows:
where σ(Z i ) is a left cyclic shift in Z i , e.g. for Z i1 = {1, 1, 1, 0, 0} and Z i2 = {1, 1, 0, 1, 0}, σ l (Z i1 ) and σ l (Z i2 ) for l ∈ Z 5 are listed as follows:
t-Tower Decodable Vector
In the Loidreau's modified cryptosystem, t-tower decodable vectors are used instead of random error vectors of weight t.
The definition of a t-tower decodable vector is given as follows:
Definition 1 (t-Tower Decodable Vector) t-tower decodable vector z is a word of length n satisfying the following three conditions:
Larger-weight: Hw(z ) > t.
Reducibility: There exists a linear combination f () such that Hw(z) ≤ t where
Recoverability: z is uniquely recoverable from the above z.
In [13] , t-tower decodable vector z is generated as follows:
where σ l () denotes a l-bit left cyclic shift. More formally, let p 1 and p 2 denote the number of σ l (Z i1 ) for any l and σ l (Z i2 ) for any l in z , respectively. Since
one can reduce the weight of z within t using either f 1 () or f 2 (). Using the corrected vector z, one can uniquely recover the corresponding t-tower decodable vector z since both f 1 () and f 2 () are one-to-one mappings.
Loidreau's Modified Cryptosystem
As we have seen in the previous subsections, Loidreau's modified cryptosystem [13] uses the field extension F 2 5s of F 2 s , i.e. it employs a Goppa polynomial g (of degree t) over a subfield F 2 s of F 2 5s to enable the Frobenius automorphism. It also employs a hiding polynomial g 1 over F 2 5s of degree t 1 (which has no roots in L) to enlarge the cardinality of the underlying polynomial gg 1 .
The cardinality of gg 1 is approximately given by {(2
t /t} since the number of irreducible monic polynomials of degree x over F 2 y is around
Both the key generation process and the encryption process are the same as the (unmodified) McEliece PKC except the following points: -All the N 5 orbits of length 5 are open to the public as a part of a public key (but the order in each orbit is kept in secret). Note that the orbits can be opened without increasing the public key size by permuting orbits and then by permuting columns in each orbit as P . Since the units of orbits are the same as L, one can know them. While it reduces the cardinality of the permutations P , it still maintains a large amount (see Table 1 and 2, respectively). -Both f 1 () and f 2 () are kept in secret (which is the same that the order in each orbit is kept in secret). -t-tower decodable vectors z are used as error vectors instead of random vectors of weight t.
The decryption process is described as follows:
Algorithm 4 (Decoding for the modified cryptosystem)
Input: a ciphertext c. Output: a corresponding plaintext msg. 1. Apply f 1 () and f 2 () to the given ciphertext c, respectively. 2. Decode f 1 (c) and f 2 (c) using the decoding algorithm for Γ (L, g). At least one of them can be corrected since the Hamming weight of the error vector of at least one of them is smaller than or equal to t. 3. Using the corrected error vector z, reconstruct the corresponding t-tower decodable vector z . 4. Apply the information-set decoding to c ⊕ z , and then recover the corresponding message msg.
If both of f 1 (c) and f 2 (c) are corrected in Step 2, decrypt two messages and then discard one using the redundancy in the plaintexts. This means the modified cryptosystem requires a redundancy in a plaintext.
One-Wayness of Modified Cryptosystem against Ever Known Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
Since the Loidreau's modification enlarges the Hamming weight of the error vectors to 3 t/2 from t, the binary work factors to break the one-wayness with the ever known CPAs, i.e. both the GISD and the FLWC attacks, are improved (see Table 3 ). The Loidreau's modification employs new secrets f 1 () and f 2 () (or equivalently the order in each orbit). Also it reduces the cardinality of permutations P , Goppa polynomials gg 1 and error vectors z , respectively. If at least one of the cardinalities is small enough to enumerate, the cryptosystem will be broken by guessing it. Fortunately, all of them still preserve a sufficient amount enough to avoid exhaustive search for them (see Table 1 and 2).
Our New Chosen-Plaintext Attacks on the Modified Cryptosystem
In this section, we show our new chosen-plaintext attacks on the one-wayness of the Loidreau's modified cryptosystem. Our attacks use the fact that 1's in a t-tower error vector z is not uniformly distributed. (This means that our new attacks are not applicable to the (unmodified) McEliece PKC since 1's in its error vector is uniformly distributed.) 
Attack I
This attack applies f 1 () and f 2 () to both the ciphertext and all the rows in the public generator matrix G , respectively. This gives
respectively 2 . One can view f 1 (G ) and f 2 (G ) as generator matrices, and do the usual search for f 1 (z ) or f 2 (z ).
Since either f 1 (z ) or f 2 (z ) has low weight and both GISD and FLWC are the generic decoding algorithms for an arbitrary linear code, msg of (28) and (29) can be decoded without knowing the algebraic structure of f 1 (G ) and f 2 (G ).
The corresponding algorithm is given as follows:
Algorithm 5 (Attack I)
Input: a ciphertext c, a public key (G , t) and attack parameters (p, ρ) ∈ Z × Z. Output: a plaintext msg.
1. Apply f 1 () and f 2 () to the given c and all the rows of G respectively, and then obtain f 1 (c), f 1 (G ), f 2 (c) and f 2 (G ).
Execute the FLWC attack
3 on the pair of f 1 (G ) and f 1 (c) and that of f 2 (G ) and f 2 (c) respectively to find the code word of weight less than or equal to t. If found, it recovers msg.
61 that can be achieved when (p, ρ) = (2, 19), t = 38 to 41 and k = n − m · t − t 1 = 635 to 605 respectively 4 . 
Attack II
For the error vector z in the modified cryptosystem, it is proposed (roughly) to split the coordinates into N 5 orbits of five, then choose p = t/2 such orbits, and in each of them to choose three positions for the non-zero bits. Under this strategy, one can again apply the usual search method, this time on orbits, rather than individual positions. We found that it is not so difficult to choose (k − 2 s )/5 orbits of all zeros or almost all zeros out of the N 5 orbits. Note that (k − 2 s )/5 corresponds with more than or equal to k coordinates. Once such k coordinates are found, one can decrypt a given ciphertext using the information-set decoding.
Algorithm 6 (Attack II)
Input: a ciphertext c, a public key (G , t) and an attack parameter j ∈ Z. Output: a plaintext msg. This algorithm repeats Step 2 around T j times where:
The binary work factors of Step 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are t · k /2, V j and 5(k − 1)(n − k )/4 respectively where
Thus the total work factor is given by
For t 1 = 9, min j (max k ,t (W j )) ≈ 2 42 that can be achieved when j = 1, t = 32 to 50 and k = n − m · t − t 1 = 693 to 517, respectively.
Conclusion
The modified McEliece PKC proposed by Loidreau at Asiacrypt 2000 [13] employs interesting techniques using the Frobenius automorphism in Goppa codes. While it certainly improves the difficulty of breaking one-wayness against the "ever known" CPAs, it is vulnerable against our "new" CPAs, which exploit the modified structure, i.e. the biased 1's in a t-tower error vector. The binary work factor to break the one-wayness of the modified McEliece PKC with our new CPA is 2 42 , which is feasible with currently available computational power. Since our new attacks do not weaken the one-wayness of the (unmodified) McEliece PKC, it still satisfies OW-CPA for n ≥ 2048 with optimum t and k. This means the (unmodified) McEliece PKC with an appropriate conversion still satisfies IND-CCA2.
